A central issue in public watermarking schemes is the design of a detector that will not reveal sufficient information that leads to the erasure of embedded watermark, even if an adversary knows the detection algorithm and the public detection key (if any). Insofar, there is no such detector in "stand-alone" setting that achieves satisfactory security requirements. Recently, [1] gives a zero-knowledge detector that achieves security by introducing a server. We propose an alternative setting of public watermarking that involves multiple servers. In this setting, the owner keeps a secret watermark W . A verifier, given an image J (or any digital media), wants to detect whether J is watermarked. The detection is to be carried out by a group of independent proxies. The owner does not trust the verifier nor any individual proxy, thus wants to keep W hidden from them. On the other hand, the verifier does not trust the owner and any individual proxy either, and wants to protect himself against cheating. The proxies, as a group, are tasked to maintain the secrecy of the watermark, and protect the interest of the verifier. We propose a scheme based on secret sharing schemes which support arithmetic operations. The security is maintained if not too many individuals (including the proxies, the owner and the verifier) collude. The proposed scheme is efficient in terms of computation cost, and the number of rounds and bandwidth required in the communications. The scheme is arguably easy to implement.
Introduction
A central issue in public watermarking schemes [4] is the design of a detector that will not reveal the secret watermarks embedded into the media, even if an adversary knows the detection algorithm and the public detection key (if any).
A possible approach uses asymmetric watermarking schemes [10, 8, 7] , where the key to embed watermarks is different from the key required during detection. However, the detection keys of known methods do reveal some crucial information, which leads to a number of successful attacks (for e.g., [7] listed a few attacks on specific schemes).
A simple approach achieves secrecy by introducing a trusted third party P . In which case the owner of the watermark gives his watermark W to P , and give a high correlation value with a randomly chosen image). The dishonest owner might also collude with a few proxies to mislead the verifier.
Note that in this setting, the role of the proxies (as a group) is similar to that of a trusted third party, who will not leak any information of the secret W , and will not cheat the verifier. The main difference is that, in this setting, we only require the integrity of the proxies as a group, which is a much weaker requirement than having a trusted third party. It is also noted that our setting relieves the owner from performing the detections. This is a secondary advantage of using proxies for detection.
The proposed setting naturally suggests the use of secret sharing schemes [15] as a basic building block. A secret sharing scheme breaks a secret z into shares and distributes each to a server. No individual server will know the secret unless a number of dishonest servers collude. There are many secret sharing schemes, satisfying various useful properties. For example, Shamir's scheme is also a threshold scheme, and with further modifications it can be verifiable [3, 9] and proactive [11] . An important property required in our setting is that, both multiplications and additions can be supported on the shares. That is, if secrets z 1 , z 2 and z 3 are integers and are shared among n severs, the shares of z 1 z 2 + z 3 can be generated without revealing the values of z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , and z 1 z 2 + z 3 .
We give a scheme based on secret sharing. This scheme achieves public watermarking as long as not too many individuals collude. This scheme is arguably easy to implement and is efficient in terms of computation and communication cost.
Outline.
In Section 2.1, we describe the basic watermarking method (spreadspectrum method) used for discussion. Section 2.2 gives our proposed multiple proxies setting, and the security requirements. Section 3 gives a brief description of secret sharing schemes. Our scheme is described in Section 4, followed by the security analysis in Section 5. Some discussions on the error-correcting capability of the scheme will be given in Section 6. 
Notations and Model

Watermarking Model
We employ a variant of the well-known spread spectrum method [5] to embed and detect watermarks. Other watermarking schemes can also be employed as long as the detection involves only multiplication and addition. Our images and watermarks are "discretized". An image I is a vector I = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ) where each x i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , d−1} and d is some integer determined by the media/image representation. For example, d could be 256 if each x i represents a pixel. The watermark W is also a vector W = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w m ) where each w i ∈ Z is an integer. In addition, the energy of the watermark W is fixed, that is W · W = E where E is some predefined threshold, and · is the vector inner product. The constant E is made known to the public.
During embedding, given an image I and the watermark W , the watermarked image I is
where the function trunc() truncates/rounds the coefficients where values are not in the range {0, 1, 2, . . . , d − 1}.
During detection, given an image J, the correlation value (J · W ) is computed. If the correlation value exceeds certain threshold, then J is declared to be watermarked.
Note that we omit the normalization of images in the embedding and detection. Normalization is not required in our discussion, but still can be incorporated if required. Thus, it is omitted for simplicity.
Owner, Proxies, and Verifier
The individuals in the proposed setting are an owner, n proxies P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n , and verifiers. The number of verifiers is not important, so we assume that there is only one verifier.
During the registration, the owner generates a secret watermark W which satisfies (W · W ) = E, where E is a constant that every individual knows. The owner sends information of W to the n proxies. Let S (0) i (W ) be the data the owner sends to the proxy P i . Let S i (W ) be the data that P i keeps and uses in subsequent computations. Note that it is not necessary that S (0)
To guard against dishonest owner, the proxies might wish to transform the original S (0) i (W )'s distributed by the owner. During the detection, a verifier wishes to know the correlation value c = J ·W of a given image J with the secret watermark W . Firstly, the verifier splits J into n pieces, S i (J), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that each of them contains partial information about J. Then it sends S i (J) to proxy P i respectively. Next, each proxy P i computes and sends the verifier partial information S i (c) of the correlation value c. After receiving data from all proxies, the verifier reconstructs the correlation value (J · W ) (Fig. 1 ).
In our proposed scheme, the partial information communicated through the network, namely S (0) i (W ), S i (W ), S i (J) and S i (c), corresponds to the "shares" in secret sharing schemes (see Section 3). Therefore, we will refer to those pieces of information as shares in the rest of this paper, even if some of them may be fraud sent by dishonest individuals.
Security Requirements
A parameter for the security requirement is the security threshold t where t ≤ n. Vaguely, the scheme should tolerate at most (t − 1) dishonest individuals (including the proxies, the verifier and the owner). The security requirements can be roughly classified into (a) maintaining the secrecy of W , and (b) protecting the interest of the the verifier. In the following, the first requirement S1 belongs to the first class and the remaining belong to the second class.
S1. Secrecy of W .
The owner generates and keeps the watermark W . Recall that the energy (W · W ) is a predefined constant E, which is known by everyone. For any (t − 1) proxies, even if they collude, they should not know W . Specifically, to any group of (t−1) proxies, any vector W satisfying (W ·W ) = E is a possible candidate for the secret watermark.
On the other hand, after detection, from the n sets of data S i (c)'s obtained, the verifier should not know W . Specifically, to the verifier, any vector W satisfying (W · W ) = E and (J · W ) = c is a possible candidate for the secret watermark.
In general, any (t − 1) individuals, including the proxies and verifier, should not know W . That is, by combining all the data held by them, any vector W satisfying (W · W ) = E and (J · W ) = c is a possible candidate for the secret watermark.
S2. Dishonest owner during registration.
During registration, instead of honestly sending S i (W ) to the proxies, an owner may send other values so as to mislead the proxies to give high correlation value during detection. Here is an example of dishonest owner: the dishonest owner chooses a watermark w and embeds it into images according to the scheme, but registers with the proxies another watermark Aw where A is a very large constant. Thus, in the subsequent detections, whatever correlation value determined will be based on Aw, instead of w. Owe to the large value of A, the probability that a randomly chosen image is wrongly declared as watermarked is higher. Therefore, we require that, after registration, with at most (t − 1) dishonest proxies, any malicious behaviour of the owner can be detected. Specifically, the proxies can check that, indeed, (W · W ) = E.
S3. Dishonest proxies during detection.
During detection, some of the proxies may collude so as to mislead the verifier. Thus, we require that, if at most (t − 1) proxies are dishonest, the verifier can detect that.
S4. Collusion among proxies and the owner during detection.
A more interesting case is collusion among the owner and proxies. The owner may collude with a few proxies and mislead the verifier. The main difference of this case from the case in previous paragraph is that: here, the owner can reveal the watermark to the proxies. With this extra information, it is easier for the proxies to influence the detection. Thus, we require that, if the owner colludes with at most (t − 2) proxies (so the total number of dishonest individuals is at most t − 1), the verifier should be able to detect that.
S5. Collusion among the owner, proxies and a verifier.
It is interesting that we should consider collusion among dishonest owner and verifier. The owner may collude with the verifier and a few proxies, so as to obtain the S i (W ) held by an honest proxy P i . After obtaining the information, they can use it to influence subsequent detections. Thus we require that, by combining information from a verifier, (t − 3) proxies, and the owner, no sufficient information on data held by honest proxies can be derived.
Remarks. Note that currently we do not consider verifier/proxies who keep the history of communications. For example, a verifier who probes the proxies by sending in a series of images. This type of attacks is generally known as sensitivity attacks. We will address this in Section 7.
Requirement on Error-Correcting
A secondary requirement is error-correcting capability. More specifically, even if some proxies are dishonest or failed, detection can still be carried out. Note the difference between security and error-correcting capability. A scheme that immediately shuts down when malicious activities are detected is considered to be secure, but it is not capable of correcting errors. We say that the errorcorrecting threshold of a scheme is R, if all detection operations can be carried out when there are at least R honest proxies.
Backgrounds on Secret Sharing Schemes
A (t, n) secret sharing scheme splits a secret (for example, a binary file) into n pieces, which are referred to as shares. Then the shares are distributed to n servers respectively. The knowledge of any t − 1 shares will not reveal the secret and the secret is reconstructible by putting together any t shares. When t < n, it is also known as a t out of n threshold scheme. Shamir gave such a scheme in 1979 [15] . For a secret z ∈ Z p , where p is a large enough prime known to everyone, the share for the i-th server is f (i) (mod p) where f (x) is a random polynomial of degree (t − 1) whose free coefficient f (0) = z. No individual server knows the coefficients of f (x), thus any t − 1 servers can not derive z from their shares. However, if t servers put their shares together, they can solve for the coefficients of f (x) and thus reconstruct the secret z.
Shamir's scheme can be modified to achieve useful properties. For example, the schemes can be verifiable [3, 9] and proactive [11] . It is also known that certain arithmetic operations of the secrets can be performed on their shares, such that the shares of the result can be obtained without revealing any of the secrets [2, 12] . In our scheme, we mainly make use of arithmetic operations on the shares. Proactive schemes can also be employed to enhance security.
Notations on Secret Sharing
With respect to a secret sharing scheme, let S i (z) be the i-th share of z, the secret 2 . Let S(V ) be the i-th share of a vector V = (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v m ). Note that the "secret" in the secret sharing scheme is an integer, whereas the watermark W and image I are vectors. To compute S(V ), we treat each v i as an independent secret. That is,
Since the shares are associated with the proxies, we also call S i (V ) the share of V for the proxy P i .
Arithmetic Operations on Shares
Consider two secrets α and β, which are encoded by f (x) and g(x) respectively as in Shamir's scheme, and the shares are distributed to 2t − 1 servers. Now, suppose the servers want to compute the shares of α + β without revealing the values of α, β or α + β. This can be easily done by instructing each server to locally construct the new share by adding the two shares it holds.
The shares for αβ can be computed similarly by computing s i,1 s i,2 , which is the share of αβ encoded by k(x) = f (x)g(x). However, the degree of k(x) is raised to 2t − 2, thus 2t − 1 servers are required to reconstruct the secrets.
In our application, instead of general combinations of multiplications and additions, we require only inner products. That is, given the shares of 
Public Watermark Detection Using Secret Sharing
The multiple proxies setting naturally suggests the use of secret sharing as a basic construction block.
Assume that there are n proxies. Suppose the security threshold we want to achieve is t, that is, if not more than (t − 1) individuals collude, the security is maintained. We also require that (2t − 1) ≤ n.
We choose a (t, n) secret sharing scheme where (2t − 1) ≤ n. Recall that n is the number of proxies, and (t − 1) is the number of dishonest individuals the system can tolerate.
The scheme consists of two parts: registration and detection.
Registration §1. Distributing watermark. The owner, using the secret sharing scheme (with the notations defined in Section 2.2 and 3.1), computes S
i (W ), the share of W for each proxy P i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The owner then sends S (0) i (W ) to P i secretly for all proxies. §2. Refreshing the shares. After receiving the shares from the owner, the proxies refresh the shares of W using the mechanisms described in Section 3. At the end of this step, each proxy P i has S i (W ) as a new share of W , and old shares S
i (W )'s are discarded.
§3. Checking W is genuine.
Each proxy P i computes the value (S i (W ) · S i (W )), and broadcasts it to other proxies. Note that this value is also the share of the inner product (W · W ) for each proxy. After receiving all data from other proxies, each proxy reconstructs (W · W ) and confirms that indeed (W · W ) = E. If not, the registration fails.
The detection is initiated by a verifier. The verifier wants to know whether an image J is embedded with the watermark claimed by the owner.
Detection §1. Distributing the image.
The verifier computes the shares of J and sends the shares to the respective proxies.
§2. Computing the shares of the correlation value.
Each proxy P i computes the inner product (S i (J)·S i (W )) and sends it back to the verifier. §3. Reconstructing the correlation value. After receiving all the shares, the verifier reconstructs the correlation value (J · W ). Recall that (2t − 1) shares are necessary and sufficient for reconstruction. Therefore, if (2t − 1) = n, there is only one possible way to reconstruct such value. Otherwise, (2t − 1) < n, and there are more than one group of (2t − 1) shares. For each group, the verifier reconstructs the value. §4. Checking for corrupted data. Since the error-correcting threshold is (2t − 1), all proxies must be honest if (2t − 1) = n. In this case, the only value the verifier reconstructed must be correct. Otherwise, the verifier checks whether there is any inconsistency among the values reconstructed from different groups of (2t − 1) shares. If so, it declares that some proxies are cheating.
To enhance security, the proxies can refresh their shares regularly. For example, after some number, say m − 1 of detections have been carried out, the proxies can refresh the shares S i (W ). This is to guard against sensitivity attacks. We will revisit these issues later.
Security Analysis
We want to show that the proposed scheme satisfies the requirements stated in Section 2.3. The requirements are generally in this form: if at most (t − 1) individuals collude, then either no extra information on W is revealed, or no sufficient information is revealed so that the colluders can manipulate the results.
In the following analysis, we treat each share as an equation, where the unknowns are the random numbers used to generate the share. To illustrate, consider a proxy P i who is holding the share S (0) i (W ), and it wants to guess the watermark W . This share is generated by the owner using (t − 1)m random numbers (note that W is a vector of m coefficients). For example, let us consider only the first coefficient w 1 , the proxy P i can expresses what it has as the equation
where w 1 , r 1 , . . . , r t−1 are the unknowns. If a proxy manages to gather t such equations or more, he would be able to solve for w 1 . Otherwise, any value is a possible candidate for w 1 . Note that the security is achieved unconditionally. That is, even if the colluders have infinite computing power, they can not compute the secret. This is in contrast to schemes that are computationally secure, where the security is based on the assumption that certain problem is computationally difficult to solve. We will omit the details for security requirements S4 and S5.
S1. Secrecy of W .
First, we investigate the case where all the (t − 1) colluders are proxies. Without loss of generality, let the colluders be the proxies P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P t−1 . Note that each P i has the shares S i (W ) and S (0) i (W ), and all proxies know S j (E) for all j, and that (W · W ) = E. Now, we want to know whether combining the information from (t − 1) proxies will reveal additional information on W .
Let us consider only S i (W ) proxy P i possesses is equivalent to 1 equation. Therefore, for t − 1 proxies, there are only t − 1 equations, and any integer (in Z d ) is a possible solution for w i , as shown in [15] . This shows that these equations do not give the proxies any advantages in computing W . Furthermore, the new shares S i (W ) are obtained after refreshing, and no information about W or S (0) i (W ) is exchanged among the proxies during this process. Therefore these values do not give any advantages in computing W either. Lastly, after computing S j (E) = S i (W ) · S i (W ), information about the elements of S i (W ) is hidden in the inner product, given that m is sufficiently large (which is true for most practical applications).
Next, suppose (t−1) colluders are the verifier and (t−2) proxies P 1 , . . . , P t−2 . The verifier knows the shares S i (c) for all i, where S i (c) = S i (W ) · S i (J). Similar to the above argument, given sufficiently large m, the information contained in the inner product is useless in attempts to obtain W .
S2. Dishonest owner during registration.
The owner could be dishonest and try to mislead the proxies so that they give false results in the detection. For instance, he could give a false watermark with high energy, so that the correlation value of the watermark and any randomly chosen image would be large with high probability. This is prevented in the registration because the proxies compute the energy of the watermark and compare it to a known constant E (Step §3 in registration). If the energy is not E, the watermark would be rejected by the proxies, and the registration would fail.
S3. Dishonest proxies during detection. The proxies could also send false results of their inner products S i (W )·S i (J) to mislead the verifier. However, since we have more than 2t − 1 proxies in the system, we can perform reconstruction of J · W multiple times from different set of shares ( Step §4 in detection). It is unlikely that the results are consistent if some proxies cheat. In this case, we can employ the method mentioned in Section 6 to both detect and correct the error.
Analysis on Error-Correcting
Besides the security requirement that no more than t − 1 proxies collude, we also require that the verifier can detect errors from proxies and correct them if there are at least (2t − 1) honest proxies 3 . Here are two methods of error correction. The first method is to let the verifier compute a new image J = kJ, where k is some integer chosen by the verifier. If the proxies are honest, the resulting correlation value c = J · W = k(J · W ) would have the integer k as its factor. If some proxies are dishonest, it is highly unlikely that the reconstructed correlation will still have k as its factor.
The other method let the verifier repeat the detection using the same image J, but using different random numbers to generate the shares of J. Thus, a group of 2t − 1 proxies would be able to give consistent results only if all of them are honest. By repeating the detections, the correct results can be obtained with arbitarily high probability. It is noted that the above two methods can be used together.
Sensitivity Attacks
A dishonest verifier might probe the proxies for the watermark. By designing the probes carefully, it may be able to get a good approximation of, or erase, the watermark, using small numbers of probes. This is generally known as sensitivity attacks. Some general attacks are given in [4, 13] . Practical attacks usually target at the image representation. For example, the well-know Stir-Mark provides a list of attacks [14] .
We classify these attacks into two types. The first type is specific to our proposed scheme and not applicable to others schemes, for instance the zeroknowledge detector [1] . The second type of attacks are designed for general public watermarking schemes. For example, the attacks described in [4, 14, 13] . In this analysis, we focus on the first type. Further research is required to handle the second type of attacks.
Let us consider a dishonest verifier. The verifier may collude with (t − 2) proxies in attempt to get the secret watermark. Let S = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s m ) be the shares of W kept by an honest server. In each detection, the verifier knows the inner product of S · V where V is some vector chosen by the verifier. Although knowing S · V will not reveal any useful information of the watermark W , by sending in many different vectors, the verifier can determine S. If the verifier knows the inner product of S · V i for i = 1, . . . , m and the V i 's are independent, then the verifier can solved for S. By knowing the shares in t proxies, the verifier can solve for W . Note that this attack is specific to our scheme. To prevent this, we can require the proxies to refresh their shares regularly, for example, after every m − 1 detections.
Communication Cost
We measure the communication cost by the number of rounds of communication and the amount of data transmitted. The size of a coefficient is not more than log p bits, where p is the prime used in the secret sharing scheme. Note that we only require p > n and p is larger than the range of the original image coefficient. Thus, it is not required to be very large. In contrast, for the zeroknowledge detector in [1] , the size of one coefficient has to be large (for e.g., more than 200 bits), so that it is computationally infeasible to break the commitment scheme. Let us assume that the size of each coefficient is 1 unit. Thus, the size of W and J is m. The size of each share is also m. During detection, the verifier sends the share S i (J) to each proxy P i , and P i returns the share S i (c) of the correlation value. Thus, only 1 round of communication is required. Since the size of each share S i (J) is m, and the size of each share S i (c) is 1, the total amount of data transmitted is (mn + n). The zero-knowledge detector in [1] invokes an interactive proof protocol during detection. Due to the "probabilistic" nature of interactive proof, many rounds are required for high level of confidence.
Higher communication cost is required during registration. This is due to the communication required in refreshing. Fortunately, registration is only performed once for each watermark. During registration, refreshing without verification can be done in 1 round with mn 2 units of data. If verification is required, then the communication cost depends on the commitment schemes and the interactive proof protocol employed.
Conclusion
We propose a setting of public watermark detection using multiple proxies. The owner registers its watermark with a group of proxies, whereas the verifier contacts the proxies to check whether an image is watermarked. We give such a scheme based on secret sharing. As long as not too many individuals collude, the secrecy of the watermark can be maintained, and the verifier can be protected from cheating. In other words, public watermark detection is achieved by the integrity of the community. The scheme is efficient in terms of communication cost and is arguably easy to implement.
